Trail-Directed Model Checking  by Edelkamp, Stefan et al.
p ( )
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume55.html 14 pages
Trail-Directed Model Checking
Stefan Edelkamp, Alberto Lluch-Lafuente and Stefan Leue
Institut fur Informatik
Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat
Georges-Kohler-Allee
D-79110 Freiburg, Germany
eMail: fedelkamp,lafuente,leueg@informatik.uni-freiburg.de
URL: www.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/~fedelkamp,lafuente,leueg
Abstract
HSF-SPIN is a Promela model checker based on heuristic search strategies. It
utilizes heuristic estimates in order to direct the search for nding software bugs in
concurrent systems. As a consequence, HSF-SPIN is able to nd shorter trails than
blind depth-rst search.
This paper contributes an extension to the paradigm of directed model checking
to shorten already established unacceptable long error trails. This approach has
been implemented in HSF-SPIN. For selected benchmark and industrial commu-
nication protocols experimental evidence is given that trail-directed model-checking
eectively shortcuts existing witness paths.
1 Introduction
The formal methods of model checking [4] have various applications in software
verication[2]. Through the exploration of large state-spaces model checking
produces either a formal proof for the desired property or a detailed description
of an error trail. We concentrate on explicit state model checking and its
application to the validation of communication protocols.
In the broad spectrum of techniques for tackling the huge state space
that are generated in concurrent systems, heuristic search is one of the new
promising approaches for failure detection. Early precursors execute explicit
best-rst exploration in protocol validation [18] and symbolic best-rst search
in the model checker Mur [22]. Symbolic guided search in CTL model check-
ing is pursued in [3] and bypasses intense symbolic computations by so-called
hints. Last but not least, the successful commercial UPPAAL verier for real-
time systems represented as timed automata has also been eectively enriched
by directed search techniques [1].
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Our own contributions to directed model checking integrate heuristic esti-
mates and search algorithms to the cke model checker [21], to a domain in-
dependent AI-planner [8], and to a Promela model checker [9,10]. The global
state space is interpreted as an implicitly given graph spanned by a succes-
sor generator function, in which paths corresponding to error behaviors are
searched. The length of the witness path is crucial to the designer/programmer
to debug the erronous piece of software; shorter trails are easier to interpret
in general.
In the model checker SPIN [13] safety properties are checked through a
simple depth-rst search of the system's state space, while liveness properties
require a two-fold nested depth-rst search. The error trail in the rst case is
a simple path from the start state to an error state, while in the second case
we have a seeded cycle, that is a path composed by a prex that leads to a
seed state, followed by a cycle that is closed at this state.
Our experimental tool HSF-SPIN
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provides AI heuristic search strategies
like A*, IDA* and best-rst for nding safety errors [10], and an improved
version of nested depth-rst search [9], based on exploting the never-claim
representation of the required temporal property to simplify the checking pro-
cess.
In this paper we concentrate on error trail improvement, an apparent need
in practical software development. We expect that a possibly long witness for
an error is already given. This trail might be found by simulation, test, random
walk, or depth-rst model checking. The witness is read as an additional input,
reproduced in the model and then signicantly improved by directed search.
HSF-SPIN tries to nd errors faster than traditional tools by employing
heuristic search strategies for non-exhaustive, guided state space exploration.
While HSF-SPIN can be used for full verication through exhaustive state
space search, this is not its primary objective and we note that other model
checkers, like Spin or SMV, are likely to be more time and space ecient for
this purpose.
The paper is structured as follows. First we give some background on the
AI technique we use. In a next section we introduce the HSF-SPIN model
checker and its usage in terms of its command line options. In the following
sections we address the facets of trail-directed search, based on the hamming
distance and the FSM distance. We distinguish between single-state trail
directed search for safety errors and cycle-detection trail-directed search for
liveness errors. Both approaches have been implemented in HSF-SPIN and in
the experimental section we present rst results. We close with some conclud-
ing remarks.
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2 Heuristic Search
Depth-rst search and breadth-rst search are call blind search strategies,
since they use no information of the concrete state space they explore. On the
other hand, heuristic search algorithms take additional search information in
form of an evaluation function into account. This function is used to rank the
desirability of expanding a node u.
A* [11] uses an evaluation function f(u) that is the sum of the generating
path length g(u) and the estimated cost of the cheapest path h(u) to the goal.
Hence f(u) denotes the estimated cost of the cheapest solution through u. If
h(u) is a lower bound then A* is optimal, i.e. it nds solution paths of optimal
length.
Table 1 depicts the implementation of A*, where g(u) is the length of the
traversed path to u and h(u) is the estimate distance from u to a failure state.
A*(s)
Open  f(s; h(s))g; Closed fg
while (Open 6= ;)
u Deletemin(Open); Insert(Closed,u)
if (failure(u)) exit Goal Found
for all v in  (u)
f
0
(v) f(u) + 1+h(v)  h(u)
if (Search(Open; v))
if (f
0
(v) < f(v))
DecreaseKey(Open; (v; f
0
(v))
else if (Search(Closed ; v))
if (f
0
(v) < f(v))
Delete(Closed ; v); Insert(Open; (v; f
0
(v))
else Insert(Open; (v; f
0
(v))
Table 1
The A* Algorithm.
The algorithm divides the state space in three sets: the set Open of visited
but not expanded states, the set Closed of visited and expanded states, and
the set of not already visited states. Similar to Dijkstra's single source shortest
path exploration [7], starting with the initial state, A* extracts states from the
Open set, move them to the Closed set and insert their successors in the Open
set until a goal state is found. In Table 1 the dierences between Dijkstra's
algorithm and A* are underlined. In each expansion step the state with best f
value is selected to be expanded next. Nodes that have already been expanded
might be encountered on a shorter path. Contrary to Dijkstra's algorithm, A*
deals with the problem by re-inserting the corresponding nodes from the set of
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already expanded nodes into the Open set. This scheme is called re-opening.
3 HSF-SPIN
HSF-SPIN merges the model checker Spin
2
and the heuristic search frame-
work HSF
3
. It is basically an extension of HSF for searching state spaces
generated by Promela models.
Like in Spin, two steps must be performed prior to the verication process.
The rst step generates the source code of the verier for a given Promela
specication. In the second step, the source code is compiled and linked for
constructing the verier. The verier then checks the model. Among other
parameters the user can specify the error type, the search algorithm, and the
heuristic estimate as command line options. It is also possible to perform
interactive simulations similar to Spin. When verication is done, statistic
results are displayed and a solution trail in Spin's format is generated.
HSF-SPIN is based on Spin and its specication language Promela. How-
ever, HSF-SPIN is not 100% Promela compatible. Promela specications with
dynamic or non-deterministic process creation are not yet accepted in HSF-
SPIN. HSF-SPIN can check all the properties that Spin can validate with
the exception of non-progress cycles. HSF-SPIN supports sequential bit-state
hashing, but not partial order reduction.
3.1 A First Example
The HSF-SPIN distribution includes a set of test models. For example, the
le deadlock.philosophers.prm implements a Promela model of a deadlock
solution to Dijkstra's dining philosophers problem. The executable check is
a verier of the model, similar to Spin's executable le pan. Deadlocks are
checked by running the verier with argument -Ed resulting in the output of
Table 2.
The verier runs depth-rst search, since it is the default search algorithm.
It nds a deadlock at depth 1,362. Following such a long trail is tedious. The
A* algorithm (option -AA) and a simple heuristic estimate for deadlock detec-
tion (option -Ha) nds a deadlock at optimal depth 34, expanding and storing
less states (17 and 67, respectively), and performing less transitions (73).
3.2 Compile and Run-Time Options
The HSF-SPIN verier accepts only a reduced subset of Spin's compile-time
options, for example -DVECTORSZ and -DGCC. The only specic compile-time
option is -DDEBUG, to report debug information when running. Each command
line argument of HSF-SPIN has the form -Xx, where X is the option to be
2
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HSF-SPIN 1.0
A Simple Promela Verifier based on Heuristic Search Strategies.
This tool is based on Spin 3.4.5 (by G.J. Holzmann) and
on HsfLight 2.0 (by S. Edelkamp)
Verifying models/deadlock.philosophers.prm...
Checking for deadlocks with Depth-First Search...
invalid endstate (at depth 1362)
Printing Statistics...
State-vector 120 bytes, depth reached 1362, errors: 1
1341 states, stored
431 states, matched
1772 transitions (transitions performed)
25 atomic steps
1341 states, expanded
Range of heuristic was: [0..0]
Writing Trail
Wrote models/deadlock.philosophers.prm.trail
Length of trail is 1362
Table 2
Running HSF on the Philosophers Problem.
set and x is the value for the option. For example, argument -Ad sets the
option search algorithm to the value depth-rst search. By giving an option
no value, the list of available values for that option is printed. For example,
executing check -A prints all available search algorithms.
Executing the HSF-SPIN verier without arguments outputs all available
run-time options, e.g. -Ax, where x is the search algorithm (A*, IDA*, DFS,
NDFS, etc.); -Ex, where x is the error to be checked (Deadlock, Assertion,
LTL, etc.); and -Hx, where x is the heuristic function (Formula-based, Ham-
ming distance, FSM distance, etc.).
4 Improvement of Trails
Since various explicit on-the-y model checkers like Spin search the superim-
posed global state space in depth-rst manner, they report the rst error that
has been encountered even if it appears at a high search depth. One natural
option to improve the trail is to impose a shallower depth on the depth-rst
search engine. However, there are two severe drawbacks to this approach.
The rst one is that bounds might increase the search eorts by magni-
tudes, since a xed traversal ordering in bounded depth-rst exploration in
large search depths might miss the lasting error states for a fairly long time.
Therefore, even if the rst error is found fast, improvements are possibly di-
cult to obtain. Moreover, to nd shorter trails by manual adjusting bounds is
time consuming, e.g., trying to improve an optimal witness will fail and result
5
in a full state exploration.
The second drawback, which we call Anomaly in Depth-Bounded Search
(cf. Figure 1) is even more crucial to this approach. It can be observed when
experimenting with explicit state model checkers that allow the search depth
to be limited to a maximum, such as it can be done in SPIN, and in which
visited states are kept in a hash-table to avoid an exponential increase in
the number of expanded nodes due to the tree expansion of the underlying
graph. This implicit pruning result in the fact, that duplicate errors in smaller
depths will not necessarily be detected anymore, since they might be blocked
by nodes that are already stored. This anomaly emerges frequently in practice
when atomic transitions are used, which correspond to potentially long non-
branching paths in the search tree. In other words, depth-bounded search
with node caching is not complete for error detection in shallower depths than
the given bound
4
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Fig. 1. Anomaly in Depth-Bounded Search.
We have observed this behavior in some of our models. For example, in
a model of a telephony system after establishing a witness of length 756, the
search with a new bound 755 fails to nd one of the remaining error states.
For the same Promela model, error detection alternates with dierent search
depths bound: up to bound 67 no error is found, from bound 68 to 139 an
error is found, from bound 140 to 154 no error is found, from 155 onwards an
error is again found, and so on.
A simple method to correct this anomaly is to enforce revisiting of some
states. More precisely, a state is revisited (reexplored) when it is reached on
a shorter path. Therefore, each state is stored in the hash-table together with
its smallest depth value. In fact, this observation was already made for the
Spin model checker, in which the anomaly is xed with the -DREACH directive.
However, since entire subtree structures for revisited states are re-explored,
this method causes a possibly exponential increase in time complexity.
4
Note that to the contrary, the iterative-deepening variant of A* (IDA*) is complete, since
it invokes the depth-rst search process starting with the smallest available bound and
increasing this bound the smallest possible amount.
6
Therefore, we aim at a dierent aspect of trail improvement; namely heuris-
tic search. The idea is to take the failure state or some of its dening features
to set up a heuristic estimate that guides the search process into the direction
of that particular state. In contrast to heuristic search strategies described in
previous work [9,10], we exhibit rened information. The main argument is
that it is easier to nd a specic error situation instead of nding any member
according to a general error description. We distinguish two heuristics and two
search algorithms. The rst heuristic is designed to focus exactly the state
that was found in the guidance trail, while the second heuristic relaxes this re-
quirement to important aspects for the given failure type. The two algorithms
divide in trail-directed search for safety property violation and trail-directed
search for liveness property violation.
4.1 Hamming Distance Heuristic
Let S be a state of the search space given in a suitable binary encoding, i.e.
as a bit vector S = (s
1
; : : : ; s
k
). Further on, let S
0
be the error state we are
searching for. One coarse estimate for the number of transitions necessary to
get from S to S
0
is the number of bit-ips necessary to transform S into S
0
.
The estimate is called the Hamming distance H
HD
(S; S
0
), determined by
H
HD
(S; S
0
) =
k
X
i=1
js
i
  s
0
i
j
Obviously, js
i
  s
0
i
j 2 f0; 1g for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Note that the estimate
H
HD
(S; S
0
) is not a lower bound, since one transition might change more than
one bit in the state description at a time. Moreover, the Hamming distance
can be rened by taking the binary encoded values of the state variables and
their modiers into account. Nevertheless, the Hamming distance reveals a
valuable ordering of the states according to their goal distances.
4.2 FSM Distance Heuristic
Another distance metric centers around the local states of the nite state ma-
chines, which together with the communication queues and variables generate
the system's global state space.
Let (pc
1
; : : : ; pc
l
) be the vector of all FSM locations in a state S, i.e. pc
i
,
i 2 f1; : : : ; lg, denotes the corresponding program counter. The FSM distance
metric H
FSM
(S; S
0
) according to the goal state S
0
with FSM state vector
(pc
0
1
; : : : ; pc
0
l
) is calculated in each FSM separately. When assuming indepen-
dence of the execution in each nite state machine we can approximate
H
FSM
(S; S
0
) =
k
X
i=1
D
i
(pc
i
; pc
0
i
)
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The distances D
i
(pc
i
; pc
0
i
) are calculated as the minimal graph theoretical
distance from pc
i
to pc
0
i
, i 2 f1; : : : ; lg. These values are computed beforehand
for each pair of local states with the all-pairs shortest-path algorithm of Floyd-
Warshall, so that the retrieval of each value D
i
(pc
i
; pc
0
i
) is a constant time
operation. In contrast to the Hamming distance, the FSM distance abstracts
from the current queue load and from values of the local and global variables.
We expect that the search will be then directed into equivalent error states
that could potentially be located at smaller search tree depths (see Figure 3).
4.3 Safety Errors
Trail-directed search for safety errors, as visualized in Figure 2, takes a trail
as an additional input for the model-checker and searches for improvements
of its length, especially for a concise and transparent bug-nding process.
S
S
S
0
S
0
Fig. 2. Safety Error Trail is Shortened by Trail-Directed Search.
In our case we extract the error state S
0
to focus the search by the above
heuristics H
HD
(S; S
0
) and H
FSM
(S; S
0
). These estimates are integrated in
the heuristic search algorithm A*. Recall that is complete, and that, if the
estimate is a lower bound, the path is optimal.
S
00
S
0
S
0
S
00
S
0
S
0
S
00
S
0
S
0
Fig. 3. Search Trees of Ordinary Search, Full-State Trail-Directed Search, and
Partial-State Trail-Directed Search.
Figure 3 depicts the search tree inclusive the established trail according
to ordinary search, A* with the Hamming distance heuristic H
HD
, and A*
with the FSM distance heuristic H
FSM
. Since H
HD
uses the entire error state
description, we call this search full-state trail-directed search, while in case of
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HFSM
only a part of the error state description is used, such that this approach
is referred to as partial-state trail-directed search.
4.4 Liveness Properties
Remember that a trail to a violated liveness property consists of a path with
an initial prex to a seed state and a cycle starting from that state. Therefore,
we can improve the witness trail by trail-directed A*-like search in both parts
(cf. Figure 4).
seedseed
seed
Fig. 4. Liveness Error Trail Shortened in Two Phases.
In a rst improvement phase we search for shortcuts of the path to the seed
state. In an independent second phase we perform a cycle-detection search, i.e.
a search guided by the seed state from which it has started. In both cases the
proposed estimate that we propose is the Hamming distance heuristic H
HD
,
since we are searching for the exact seed state, and not for an equivalent one.
5 Experiments
In our experimental study selected examples for trail improvements are used.
We apply the above algorithms to trails obtained by our depth-rst search
algorithm, producing the same or very similar results to SPIN's depth-rst
search traversal.
First we consider deadlock detection. As an example we choose the in-
dustrial GIOP protocol [15] with a seeded bug and a model of a concurrent
program that solves the stable marriage problem [19]
5
. Table 3 shows that
the witness trail is improved to about a half of its original length. The values
67 and 65 in the GIOP model are close to the optimal trail length of 58. In the
second case the solution path obtained when using the FSM-based heuristic
is near to the optimum of 62 and notably better of the length provided by
5
The Promela sources and further information about these models can be obtained from
www.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/~lafuente/models/models.html
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the algorithm with the Hamming distance heuristic. However, in both exam-
ples the search eorts are signicantly higher in the case of the FSM-based
heuristic than in the case of the Hamming distance heuristic.
DFS TDA*,H
HD
TDA*,H
FSM
GIOP Stored States 326 988 30,629
(N=2,M=1) Transitions 364 1,535 98,884
Expanded States 326 432 24,485
Witness Trail 134 67 65
Marriers Stored States 407,009 26,545 225,404
(N=4) Transitions 1,513,651 56,977 467,704
Expanded States 407,009 16,639 192,902
Witness Trail 121 99 66
Table 3
Improving Trails of Deadlocks with Trail-Directed Search in the GIOP and
Marriers models.
In the second set of examples we examine another safety property class,
namely state invariants. The two protocols we consider are a Promela model
of an Elevator system
6
and the POTS telephony protocol model [16]. Table 4
shows that the witness trail is shortened by trail-directed search from 510
to 203 and from 756 to 67, respectively. In this case there is no signicant
dierence between the two heuristic estimates.
A bad sequence corresponds to a violation of a liveness property. How-
ever, it does not reect a cyclic witness but a simple path. The results in
Table 5 shows the impact of trail improvement in this scenario for a model of
a Fundamental-Mode Circuit (FMC [20]).
The last example is trail improvement for liveness properties that include
cycles at seed states in their witness paths. Once more we use the Elevator
protocol as a representative example.
Table 6 depicts the results of trail-directed search applied to trails ob-
tained by nested depth-rst search (NDFS) and the improved version of this
algorithm (INDFS). It is shown that cycle seeds are found at smaller depths
for the error trails of both algorithms, while the cycle length has not been
improved. On the other hand considerable work is necessary to improve the
length of the trail. Since this is only a single data point more protocols with
liveness properties are required for a better judgment.
6
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DFS TDA*,H
HD
TDA*,H
FSM
Elevator Stored States 292 38,363 38,538
(N = 3) Transitions 348 146,827 147,277
Expanded States 292 38,423 38,259
Witness Trail 510 203 203
POTS Stored States 506,751 2,668 2,019
Transitions 1,468 10
6
6,519 4,889
Expanded States 506,751 2,326 997
Witness Trail 756 67 67
Table 4
Improving Trails of Invariants Violation with Trail-Directed Search in the Elevator
and POTS models.
DFS TDA*,H
HD
TDA*,H
FSM
FMC Stored States 270 438 419
(N = 3) Transitions 364 664 624
Expanded States 279 437 412
Witness Trail 259 73 73
Table 5
Improving the Trail of a Bad Sequence in the FMC model.
6 Conclusions
While previous work on directed model checking concentrates on detecting
unknown error states, the paradigm of trail-directed model checking contem-
plates the improvement of trails result from error detections, simulations, etc.
On the other hand, although paths to errors could be improved with directed
model checking, the new paradigm proposes richer heuristics based on the in-
formation of a singleton given error states. Moreover directed model checking
is restricted to safety properties, while trail-directed model checking is able to
improve error trails corresponding to such type of properties.
Trail improvement in our directed model checking tool HSF-SPIN turns
out to be an eective aid in software design of concurrent systems. With an
acceptable overhead already existing paths are reduced by heuristic search for
the established error. The rst results are promising and put forth the idea
of trail-directed model checking, that might include more information than the
mere description of the error state.
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NDFS TDA*,H
HD
INDFS TDA*,H
HD
Elevator Stored States 171 11,205 166 10,930
(N = 2) Transitions 259 38,307 194 37,656
Expanded States 208 10,901 166 10,764
Seed at Depth 187 173 177 163
Cycle Length 90 90 90 90
Total Length 277 263 267 253
Table 6
Improving the Trail of Liveness Property Violation in the Elevator Protocol.
One early approach for focusing trail information is diagnostic model check-
ing for real-time systems [17]. It also shifts attention to highlight failure detec-
tion, but does not clarify why the established traces are improved compared
to ordinary failure trails. Another line of research aims not only to report
what went wrong, but explain why it went wrong. However, most approaches
in this class such as assumption truth-maintenance systems implemented in
the General Diagnostic Engine (GDE [6]) turn out to scale badly.
At the moment we concentrate on SPIN's Promela specication language,
but in future we are interested in verifying real software in Java and C. The
Bandera tool [5] developed at Kansas University allows slicing of distributed
Java-Programs with an export to either SPIN or SMV. The same research line
is pursued by the Automated Software Engineering group at NASA Ames Re-
search Center that apply a Java byte code verier, called Java Path Finder [12].
On the other side, Holzmann [14] has pushed the envelope for actual C-Code
verication with the SPIN validator.
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